In this paper, we proposed a new directed signature scheme based on hybrid problems; factoring and discrete logarithm. This scheme authorizes only an intended verifier to verify a resulting signature. In fact, both signer and verifier also should be able to prove the resulted signature to any third party whenever necessary. Until today, the security of many existing directed signatures is only based on a single hard problem like factoring, discrete logarithm or elliptic curve discrete logarithm. Although these schemes seem secure nowadays but in a near future, if an adversary finds a solution of these hard problems then the schemes will no longer be secured. Thus, we develop a newly designed scheme which provides greater security level than single hard problem-based scheme since it is impossible for the adversary to solve the two hard problems simultaneously.
Introduction
Digital signature scheme, invented theoretically by Diffie and Hellman [15] is one of the most reliable security procedure in modern cryptography era to sign any documents electronically. As the concept of ordinary signatures, digital signatures are used to authenticate the contents of documents or electronic messages and validate an identity of the message signer [11] . In fact, the signature must be unique and cannot be applied to other electronic documents. According to history records, there are many types of digital signature that have been designed and explored such as blind signatures [4] , proxy signatures [12] , fail-stop signatures [2] and undeniable signature [5] . Each type of these digital signatures has their own properties and uses in order to identify the source of digital data and provide data integrity. Consider this scenario: Alia wants to get her digital medical certificate from private medical center with a valid signature on it from a doctor. This certificate is personally sensitive to her and definitely only she is able to verify the authenticity and integrity of the resultant signature. In fact, only she could be able to convince anyone else that the signature is a valid signature issued by the doctor. In this situation, it is very important to make sure that the proof of validity is accepted by the public. So, a digital signature with special characteristics; the so-called directed signature introduced by Lim and Lee [3, 7] could solve this problem. This signature is intended to protect the privacy of the signature receiver by ensuring that the use of a signature is fully under control by the verifier.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the security of many existing directed signatures [3, 6, 9, 10] are only based on a single hard problem like factoring (RSA), discrete logarithm (ElGamal) or elliptic curve discrete logarithm ( Koblitz & Miller) . Perhaps, in the near future those systems will no longer be secured if an adversary successfully can solve these single hard problems. Therefore, to prevent this, developing a new scheme based on hybrid problems is the best solution since it is very impossible to solve two hard problems simultaneously [14] . Our newly directed signature scheme is based on factoring and discrete logarithm definitely provides greater level of security than the scheme based on single hard problem.
Preliminaries
In this section, we will define both of hybrid problems and directed signature in general. We also discuss some notations that will be used in this new scheme.
Definitions
Definition 1 (Factoring problem, FAC) . Given a positive integer ݊ ൌ ‫ݍ‬ where ‫‬ and ‫ݍ‬ are large primes numbers, find ‫‬ and ‫.ݍ‬ Definition 2 (Discrete Logarithm Problem, DLP). Given a finite cyclic group ‫,ܩ‬ a generator ݃ of ‫,ܩ‬ an element ܽ and a large prime ‫,ݐ‬ find the integer ‫,ݔ‬ 0 ‫ݔ‬ ‫|ܩ|‬ െ 1, such that ܽ ൌ ݃ ௫ ሺmod ‫ݐ‬ሻ.
Definition 3 (Directed Signature Scheme). A directed signature scheme is a scheme that consists of four algorithms stated as followed:
1. Key Generation (GEN): An algorithm for both signer and verifier to generate all public keys, PK and secret keys, SK. 2. Signature Generation (SIGN): An algorithm to produce a signature on any input message ݉ such as ࣭: ሺࣧ ൈ ࣥሻ ↦ ࣛ where ࣭ denoted as signing function, ࣧ and ࣥ as message and set of keys respectively while ࣛ as resulted signature. 3. Verifying Generation (VER): An algorithm for verifier to check the validity of the resulted signature such as ࣰ: ሺࣛሻ ⟼ 0 (reject) or 1 (accept) 4. Public Verification (PVER): An algorithm to convince any third party that the signature is valid without revealing the actual signer by using Zero-Knowledge Technique [13] .
Some notations
Throughout this paper, we will use the following parameters and notations. Let ‫‬ be a large prime number and ݊ , ݊ be the factor of ‫‬ െ 1 that are the product of two safe primes. Suppose that ݄ሺ•ሻ is a cryptographic one-way hash function which input is an arbitrarily bit of length and produce a ‫-ݐ‬bit length output. We assume that ‫ݐ‬ ൌ 128. The numbers ߮ሺ݊ ሻ and ߮ሺ݊ ሻ are phi-Euler functions and parameters ݃ and ݃ are elements with order ݊ and ݊ satisfying ݃ ಲ ൌ 1 mod ‫‬ and ݃ ಳ ൌ 1 mod ‫‬ respectively. A gcdሺܽ, ܾሻ
indicates the greatest common divisor of ܽ and ܾ. The numbers ‫,‬ ݃ , ݃ , ݊ and ݊ are common public parameters for user A and B.
A New Directed Signature Scheme
We now present the new directed signature scheme based on factoring and discrete logarithms. We indicate Alia is a signer, Bob is an intended verifier and Citra is the third party in this scheme who needs to be convinced about the validity of signature. Alia wants to generate a signature on message ݉ so that only Bob can directly verify the produced signature and prove to Citra whenever necessary. Now we show how Alia and Bob can generate the set of keys that will be used later.
Algorithm of key generation for Alia
Step 1: Alia computes ݊ ൌ ܴܵ where ܴ and ܵ are safe primes.
Step 2: She picks randomly an integer ݁ ∈ Ժ ಲ * which is gcdሺ݁ , ݊ ሻ ൌ 1.
Step 3: She computes ݀ ൌ ݁ ିଵ mod ߮ሺ݊ ሻ.
Step 4: She selects an integer ‫ݔ‬ from Ժ * .
Step 5: She calculates ‫ݕ‬ ൌ ݃ ௫ ಲ mod ‫.‬ Hence, the public and secret keys for Alia are respectively given by (݁ , ‫ݕ‬ ሻ and ሺ݀ , ‫ݔ‬ ሻ.
Algorithm of key generation for Bob
Step 1: Bob computes ݊ ൌ ܷܶ where ܶ and ܷ are safe primes.
Step 2: He then picks randomly an integer ݁ ∈ Ժ ಳ * which is gcdሺ݁ , ݊ ሻ ൌ 1.
Step 3: He computes ݀ ൌ ݁ ିଵ mod ߮ሺ݊ ሻ.
Step 4: He selects an integer ‫ݔ‬ from Ժ * .
Step 5: He calculates ‫ݕ‬ ൌ ݃ ௫ ಳ mod ‫.‬ Hence, the public and secret keys for Bob are respectively given by (݁ , ‫ݕ‬ ሻ and ሺ݀ , ‫ݔ‬ ሻ.
Algorithm for signature generation
Let ݉ be a message. Now we show how Alia can sign a message that is personally sensitive to Bob.
Step 1: Alia selects 1 ൏ ܿ, ݆, ݇ ൏ ݊ such as gcdሺܿ, ݊ ሻ ൌ gcdሺ݆, ݊ ሻ ൌ gcdሺ݇, ݊ ሻ ൌ 1.
Step 2: She computes ‫ݎ‬ ൌ ݃ mod ‫‬ and ‫ݏ‬ ൌ ൫‫ݕ‬ ି ݃ ൯mod ‫.‬
Step 3: She calculates ‫ݓ‬ ൌ ߛ ಳ mod ‫‬ where ߛ ൌ ݄ሺ݃ , ݇, ݉ሻ Step 4: Next, she calculates ‫ݑ‬ ൌ ሺ݆ ‫ݔ‬ ߛሻmod ݊ and ‫ݖ‬ ൌ ‫ݑ‬ ௗ ಲ mod ݊ .
Step 5: She calculates ߙ ൌ ݇ ଶ mod ݊ .
Step 6: Lastly, she sends ሺ‫,ݎ‬ ‫,ݏ‬ ‫,ݖ‬ ݉, ‫,ݓ‬ ߙሻ to Bob.
Algorithm for verifying generation
An intended verifier can check the validity of the signature by following the steps below:
Step 1: Bob computes ߚ ൌ ‫ݏ‬ሺ‫ݎ‬ሻ ௫ ಳ mod ‫.‬
Step 2: He solves ߙ ൌ ݇ ଶ mod ݊ for ݇ via an Extended Euclidean Algorithm and Chinese Remainder Theorem [1] .
Step 3: He uses his private key ݀ to recover ߛ where
Step 4: He checks that ߛ ൌ ݄ሺߚ, ݇, ݉ሻ.
Step 5: Lastly, he verifies the equation ݃ ௭ ಲ ൌ ‫ݕߚ‬ ఊ mod ‫.‬ If it is different, he will reject.
For further details in step 2, you may refer [8] . For some cases, there is a need for the verifier to convince any third party the validity of the resulted signature such that the third party gains no information about the actual signature except the validity of the signature. This algorithm goes as followed:
Algorithm for public verification
Step 1: Bob sends ሺߚ, ߛ, ݉ሻ to Citra.
Step 2: Then, he also sends ݇ to Citra via secure channel and Citra checks that ߛ ൌ ݄ሺߚ, ݇, ݉ሻ.
Step 3: Bob proves to Citra that log ಳ ‫ݕ‬ ൌ log ‫ݏߚ‬ ିଵ by using zeroknowledge technique [14] 
Security Analysis
Now, we discuss the correctness of the verification equation. It can be proven as followed:
Theorem: If the algorithms of key generation and signing run smoothly, then the verification procedure is correct. Proof: The equation in verifying algorithm for step 1 and 5 are true since:
ൌ ‫ݕߚ‬ ఊ mod ‫.‬ Next, we want to show some possible attacks that an adversary (Adv) may try in order to break down the new developed scheme. For each attack, we describe the ability of adversary can do and give reasons why this attack would fail.
Attack 1: Adv wishes to get secret key information ሺ݀ , ‫ݔ‬ , ݀ , ‫ݔ‬ ሻ using all information that is available from the scheme. In this situation, Adv needs to solve
mod ߮ሺ݊ ሻ and ݀ ൌ ݁ ିଵ mod ߮ሺ݊ ሻ respectively. This is obviously infeasible because of the difficulty of solving FAC and DLP.
Attack 2: Adv wishes to impersonate as the signer. We assume that Adv is able to solve DLP. In this situation, Adv knows ‫ݔ‬ and ‫ݔ‬ . He select randomly three integers of ݇ ത ଵ , ݇ ത ଶ and ݇ ത ଷ . Then, he can generate the number of ‫̅ݎ‬ , ‫̅ݏ‬ , ߛ̅ , ‫ݓ‬ ഥ, ‫ݑ‬ ത and ߙ ത in signing algorithm. Unfortunately, Adv does not know ݀ hence he cannot compute ‫̅ݖ‬ . Thus, he fails to break down this scheme.
Attack 3:
It is assumed that Adv is able to solve FAC problem. In this situation, Adv knows the prime factorization of ݊ and ݊ and can find the numbers of ݀ and ݀ . However, he cannot compute ‫ݑ‬ since there is no information available for ‫ݔ‬ . Thus, he fails to attack the scheme. Now, let say that if it is impossible for Adv to pretend as Bob, then he can verify the resulted signature. 
Efficiency Performance
In this section, we compare the performance of our scheme with others existing directed signature scheme in terms of number of keys, computational complexity and communication cost. We indicate the following notation to analyze the performance of this scheme.
• ܶ ா is the time for modular exponentiation • ܶ ெ is the time for modular multiplication • ܶ ூே is the time for modular inverse computation • ܶ ு is the time for performing a one-way hash function ݄ሺ•ሻ • ܶ ௌொோ is the time for modular squaring
The time for performing modular addition or subtraction computation is negligible.
The comparison performance between our developed scheme and existing directed signatures based on the signature generation, verifying generation and public verification are shown in Table 1 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we present the new directed signature scheme based on hybrid problems; factoring and discrete logarithm. Although this scheme is less efficient than the scheme based on single hard problem, but it provides a greater level of security since the two hard problems cannot be solved simultaneously. 
